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3.2.1. In this chapter we shall deal with the
concept of list system in addition to the existing
`first-past-the post (FPP) system' which was proposed in
our working paper. The reasons for introducing this system
have been set out in chapter three of part one of this
report as well as in the working paper. In the seminars
conducted by the Law Commission and in the responses
received pursuant to the circulation of working paper,
various views have been expressed which we shall discuss
hereinbelow.
3.2.2. Shri S. Jaipal Reddy who presided over the
second session of the National Seminar on 23rd January 1999
opposed the introduction of list system altogether while
conceding that the list system is certainly more
representative. He opined that that alone should not be
the objective of the elections. According to him, the list
system was likely to lead to proliferation of political
parties. In a society which is indeed a "society of
minorities", this system, he said, would not promote the
national interest. He also pointed out that in the list
system, the umbilical cord between the constituency and the
candidate is absent. He pointed out that list system was
preferred in countries with homogenous societies and was
not suited to a country like India whose society was the
most heterogenous in the world, divided as it was on the
grounds of religion, caste, language, region, race and so
on. Even if the list system was introduced, he said, it
should not be confirmed to recognised political parties as
suggested by the Law Commission. He gave the example of
Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh, which was formed just
about nine months before the elections to the Legislative
Assembly in Andhra Pradesh and yet swept the polls in 1983.
He suggested that all the registered political parties
should be allowed top participate in the election held on
the basis of list system. Mr. Jaipal Reddy also pointed
out several merits of the existing FPP system. According
to him, the FPP system had the merit of reducing the number
of political parties. The present proliferation of
political parties in this country is taking place in spite
of the FPP system, he said. According to him, the FPP
system led to stability by eliminating smaller parties.
According to him, there must necessarily be an intimate
connection between the candidate and the constituency. Mr.
Jaipal Reddy also pointed out that there should be a rule
that for obtaining any seat under the list system, a
political party must obtain certain prescribed minimum
percentage of votes and in this connection, referred to the
position obtaining in Greece and Germany - particularly in
the latter country. Unless a political party got a
particular specified percentage of votes in the
parliamentary or assembly elections, it should not get any
seats, he suggested. He commended such a rule to be
adopted in case the list system was to be adopted.
3.2.2.1. The views of Mr. Jaipal Reddy were
supported by Shri D.V. Subba Rao, Member, Bar Council of
India and Shri Margabandhu, MP and Chairman, Tamil Nadu Bar
Council. Mr. Margabandhu opined that such a system would
benefit the money bags and would be unable to reflect
regional interests and aspirations. Views to the same
effect were expressed by Shri Kapil Sibal, MP (Congress-I)
at the seminar held on 14th November 1998. Shri Ram
Jethmalani, the Hon'ble Minister for Urban Development,
purporting to express his personal views, opposed the list
system. He said that Rajya Sabha is already there to serve
the purpose behind the list system. He further opined that
introduction of list system would give rise to two classes
of MPs - one elected directly and the other elected
according to list system. He referred to Lord Jenkin's
report published some time in October-November in U.K.
(reference to this report was also made by Dr. S.C. Jain,
Member Secretary of Law Commission in his initial remarks
at the seminar held on 14th November, 1998) which
recommended alternative vote plus system. He suggested
that the existing FPP system could be replaced by a single
transferable vote. List system, he said, would help in
entrenching coalitions.
3.2.3. Shri Jana Krishnamurthy, Vice President of
the BJP opined in the seminar held on 14th November, 1998
that there was a danger of the list system encouraging
casteist and communal tendencies and is likely to promote
caste-based and relation based political parties. He
pointed out that introduction of such a system would lead
to several small parties putting up their candidates in
several constituencies with the hope that the totality of
the votes polled by them would yield some seats under the
List system, which they would not have got under the FPP
system.
3.2.4. On the other hand, several political
parties, individuals and organisations supported the list
system. In particular, the two Communist parties, the DMK
and the Shiromani Akali Dal supported the introduction of
the list system wholeheartedly. Indeed, it was suggested
by Shri Sitaram Yechury (representing the CPM), Shri T.R.
Balu (representing the DMK) and Shri Manjeet Singh Khera
(representing Shiromani Akali Dal) that the number of seats
to be filed according to list system should be raised to
50% of the existing strength of Lok Sabha and the
Legislative Assemblies, instead of restricting it to 25% as
suggested by the Law Commission. Shri M.S. Khera opined
that the apprehension that the list system would encourage
casteist tendencies was misplaced. List system was also
strongly supported by Shri H.K. Dua, senior journalist who
too wanted the strength of members to be elected on this
basis raised to 50%. According to him, the Law
Commission's proposal was a definite improvement over the
existing electoral scene. Shri A.B. Bardhan (CPI)
strongly commended the list system. According to him it
was overdue. He said that prominent campaigners for the
political parties were usually tied up in campaigns for
their parties all over the country and could not devote
adequate attention to their particular constituency. The
list system would help such persons to become members of
Lok Sabha/State Legislature. He pointed out that such a
system was working quite well in Germany and Japan. He
sought to allay the apprehension that criminals and money
bags were likely to get into Parliament/Legislatures
through this method. Shri Rajinder Sachhar, senior
advocate and former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court supported the list system but he did not agree with the
concept of territorial units. He suggested that list
system should be implemented on all-India basis. Shri
Inderjit, senior journalist, Shri N. Ram, senior
journalist and Editor, Frontline, Shri C.R. Irani, Editor,
The Statesman and Shri V.K. Samayak, President, `Voters
Forum Foundation of India', New Delhi, and Shri S. Sahay,
senior journalist not only supported the list suystem but
wanted it to be raised to 50% of the existing strength
instead of the suggested 25%. Another senior advocate,
Shri Jitendra Sharma supported the idea but suggested that
it should be operated on all-India basis. This, he said,
was necessary to curb casteism and communalism.
3.2.5. In connection with the carving of
territorial units, one of the participants Shri
Shivaramakrishnan pointed out that if the latest census was
made the basis, then the southern States, in particular
Kerala, would be adversely affected. He pointed out that
because of better implementation of family planning
programmes, their population growth has slowed down while
the rate of growth in the northern States like U.P. and
Bihar remained more of less unaffected. If in such a
situation, the latest census was made the basis for
redrawing the territorial constituencies or territorial
units, the southern States would stand to lose
substantially. It would really amount to punishing them
for successful implementation of family planning
programmes. Facts and figures were cited in support of
such an argument. It was stated that with a view to
allaying this apprehension, it should be provided that 1971
cansus shall be the basis of drawing up territorial units.
Indeed, such a provision already existed in clause (3) of
article 81 of the Constitution. Since we are accepting
their plea, it is not necessary to cite the facts and
figures in support of the said plea.
3.2.6. We may also refer to the views expressed by
several persons and organisations who communicated their
views in response to our working paper. Shri Arun Jaitley
(senior advocate), Rajasthan Legislative Assembly
Secretariat, Shri P.V. Namjoshi, Delhi Bhartiya Grammin
Mahila Sangh, Shri C.K. Jain (former Secretary-General,
Lok Sabha), Hill States People's Democratic Party,
Meghalaya, Registrar High Court of M.P., Jabalpur,.
opposed the list system. Some others, namely , CPI(M),
Shri R.S. Narula, retired Chief Justice of Punjab and
Haryana High Court and Manipur People's Party, agreed with
the proposal to introduce the list system. Shri R.S.
Narula suggested that the list system should be the only
method by which the totality of Members of Lok Sabha and
Legislative Assemblies should be elected. Several other
individuals expressed varying views which need not be
specifically referred to herein.
3.2.6.1. The fact of `wasting' away of the votes
cast in the FPP system has also been ecognised in other
parts of the world. Thus in the response of the Electoral
Reform Society to the Commission on Local Government and
the Scottish Parliament, (July, 1998), it has been
mentioned inter alia, that the FPP system distorted the
expressed wishes of those who actually voted by observing
thus:-
"Local Democracy"
Question 2
One of the reasons for poor turnouts at local
government election is that the votes of large numbers of
electors will not count, either within their local
constituency or in the overall composition of the Council.
Until this has been corrected, changing administrative
arrangements will only have a limited effect.
The magnitude of this problem is not often
appreciated. For example, in the local authority elections
in April, 1995 in Edinburgh, 49% of those who actually
voted cast a vote that had no effect in securing the
election of any representative as they were for losing
candidates. It is common in all first-past-the-post (FPTP)
elections for between 30% and 60% of the votes cast to be
'wasted' in this way. In circumstances where they know
that one party holds a seat with a large majority, many
electors are discouraged from turning out to vote."
"The results of the local authority elections in
April, 1995 show well the extent to which the
present FPTP voting system distorts the expressed
wishes of those who actually vote. In the city of
Glasgow Council, Labour, with 61% of the votes,
took 77 of the 83 seats, i.e. 93%. There were
also serious distortions among the smaller parties
in this election: the Conservatives with 7% of the
votes, took 3 seats, while the SNP gained only 1
seat despite having 23% of the votes."
3.2.6.2. The Report of the Independent Commission on
the voting System ("Jenkins Report") summarises the Main
Electoral Systems in the world. These include
i) First Past the Post (FPTP)
ii) The Alternative Vote (AV)
iii) Supplementary vote (SU)
iv) Second Ballot
v) List Systems
vi) Single Transferable Vote (STV)
vii) Mixed Systems: the Additional member System
(including AV or SV Top-up) and Parallel Systems
(AMS)
3.2.6.3. The terms of reference of the said
Commission given in December, 1997, was to recommend the
`best alternative system' or combination of systems to the
existing commonly-called `First Past the Post' system of
election to the Westminister Parliament. In doing this, it
was asked to take into account four not entirely compatible
`requirements'. They were: i) broad proportionality; (ii)
the need for stable government; (iii) an extention of voter
choice, and (iv) the maintenance of a link between MPs and
geographical constituencies.
3.2.6.4. The Commission set out the basis of fair
election viz., to the concept of `fairness' in electoral
outcomes, the place of political parties; and the role of
Members of Parliament.
3.2.6.4A. It emphasises that fairness to voters is
the first essential. A primary duty underlying an
electoral system is to represent the wishes of the
electorate as effectively as possible. The Commission
observes that the major fault of the First past the Post in
this context is that it distorts the desires of the voters.
It emphasises that the fact that voters do not get the
representation they want is more important than that the
parties do not get the seats to which they think they are
entitled.
3.2.6.5. After going through the
problems/advantages/disadvantages of the existing First
Past the Post system, the said Commission recommended,
inter alia as under:
"The best alternative for Britain to the
existing First Past the Post system is a two-vote
mixed system which can be described as either
limited AMS or AV Top-up. The majority of MPs (80
to 85%) would continue to be elected on an
individual constituency basis, with the remainder
elected on a corrective Top-up basis which would
significantly reduce the disproportionality and the
geographical divisiveness which are inherent in
FPTP. But it cannot be denied that democracy
postulates the working out of a system which is
best suited to the peculiar needs of the country."
3.2.6.6. It appears that a committee appointed to
suggest electoral reforms in Spain, prepared the following
summary on an overview of the elctoral systems obtaining in
various countries.
"Summary of Electoral System Types
There are hundreds of electoral systems
currently in use and many more permutations on each
form, but for the sake of simplicity we have
categorised electoral systems into three broad
families:
.the plurality-majority,
.the semi-propotional, and
.the proportional.
Within these three we have ten "sub-families".
-First Past the Post (FPTP),
-the Block Vote (BV),
-the Alternative Vote (AV), and
-the Two-Round System (TRS) are all
plurality-majority systems.
-Parallel systems,
-the Limited Vote (LV) and
-the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
are semi-proportional systems.
-List PR,
-Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), and the
-Single Transferable Vote (STV) are all
proportional systems.
Every one of the 212 parliamentary electoral
systems listed in The Global Distribution of Electoral
Systems can be categorised under one of these ten headings,
and this family tree, though rooted in long-established
conventions, is the first to take account of all the
electoral systems used for parliamentary elections in the
world today, regardless of wider questions of democracy and
legitimacy. We hope it offers a clear and concise guide to
the choice among them.
The most common way to look at electoral systems is
to group them by how closely they translate national votes
won into parliamentary seats won; that is, how proportional
they are. To do this, one needs to look at both the
vote-seat relationship and the level of wasted votes, For
example, South Africa used a classically proportional
electoral system for its first democratic elections of
1994, and with 62.65% of the popular vote the African
National Congress (ANC) won 63% of the national seats (see
South Africa: Election Systems and Conflict Management).
The electoral system was highly proportional, and the
number of wasted votes (i.e., those which were cast for
parties which did not win seats in the Assembly) was only
0.8% of the total. In direct contrast the year before, in
the neighbouring nation of Lesotho, a classically
majoritarian First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system
had resulted in the Basotho Congress Party winning every
seat in the 65 member parliament with 75% of the popular
vote; there was no parliamentary opposition at all, and the
25% of electors who voted for other parties were completely
unrepresented. This result was mirrored in Djibouti's
Block Vote election of 1992 when all 65 parliamentary seats
were won by the Rasemblement Populaire pour le progr s with
75% of the vote.
However, under some circumstances,
non-proportional electoral systems (such as FPTP) can
accidentally give rise to relatively proportional overall
results. This was the case in a third Southern African
country, Malwai, in 1994. In that election the leading
party, the United Democratic Front won 48% of the seats
with 46% of the votes, the Malawaian Congress Party won 32%
of the seats with 34% of the votes, and the Alliance for
Democracy won 20% of the seats with 19% of the votes. The
overall level of proportionality was high, but the clue to
the fact that this was not inherently a proportional
system, and so cannot be categorized as such, was that the
wasted votes still amounted to almost one-quarter of all
votes cast."
3.2.6.7. There may varied electoral systems
prevalent in the world but many may not suit conditions in
our society. On a threadbare analysis of various systems,
we feel that a combination of FPP and the list systems as
detailed in this report may best meet out needs.
3.2.7. Accordingly, the Law Commission is of the
opinion that the list system should be introduced as
suggested by it for the reasons assigned hereinbefore. The
main objections against this system are two-fold: (a) that
it will lead to and encourage casteist and communal voting
patterns and would lead to proliferation of caste based and
religion based political parties and (b) that under the
list system, the umbilical cord between the voters in the
constituency and the MPs/MLAs is missing. In our opinion
both the said objections are not well-founded. We shall
deal with both of them hereinbelow.
3.2.8. So far as the objection that the list
system would lead to casteist and communal voting patterns
and caste-based and religion-based political parties is
concerned, the apprehension on this score can be allayed by
providing that the votes polled by such candidate whose
deposit has been forfeited under sub-section (4) of section
158 of the Act shall not be taken into consideration while
tabulating the votes for the purpose of choosing the
members on the basis of the list system. It may be noticed
that according to sub-section (4) of section 158 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 the deposit made by
a candidate who "is not elected and the number of valid
votes polled by him does not exceed one-sixth of the total
number of valid votes polled by all the candidates" is
liable to be forfeited. In other words, if any candidate
polls less than 16.25% of the valid votes polled, his
security deposit is liable to be forfeited. If it is
provided that the votes polled by candidates whose security
deposit has been forfeited under the aforesaid provision
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of list
system, the apprehension that list system would lead to
proliferation of caste-based and religion-based olitical
parties or that it would result in encouraging or promoting
casteist or communal voting pattern would not survive.
3.2.8.1. Secondly, it must be noted - and it
needs to be emphasised - that according to the proposal put
forward by the Law Commission, it is not as if each voter
is given two votes, one to be cast in favour of the
candidate from the concerned territorial constituency and
the other in favour of the list put forward by a recognised
political party. There is only one vote given to the voter
and that is cast by the voter keeping in mind both the
candidate from the concerned territorial constituency as
well as the persons included in the list put forward by
that RPP. Primarily, the vote will be in favour of the
direct candidate contesting from the concerned territorial
constituency and it is only secondarily that the said vote
is also taken into account for the purpose of list system
as well.
3.2.8.2. We may also mention that
notwithstanding the present FPP system, there has been an
unmanageable and unhealthy proliferation of political
parties and that in the Twelfth Lok Sabha, there were as
many as 30 or more political parties, some of them having
only one member. The proliferation of political parties
appears to be mainly inspired by regional, caste,
religious /communal and linguistic considerations, besides
the personality clashes between the leaders of a given
political party. Very often splits take place in political
parties not on the basis of any ideological differences (as
was the case in the case of split in the Communist Party of
India in 1964 giving rise to two parties namely CPI and
CPI-M) but mainly on account of personality clashes and
personal rivalries and ambitions. While it would not be in
good taste to refer to specific instances in support of
this view, the fact is there for all to see. May be ours
is still a young democracy. 50 years in the life of a
democratic nation is not too long. We can only hope that
with the passage of time there will be polarisation among
the political parties on the basis of ideologies and that
the voters would also realise that voting for small parties
is not in the ultimate interest of the nation.
3.2.8.3 In fact, the proliferation of political parties can
be checked to a large extent and the process of
polarisation accelerated substantially, if a new provision
is made in the Act to the effect that any political party
which obtains less than 5% of the total valid votes cast in
the country (in the case of Parliament) and in the
concerned State (in the case of Legislative Assembly) shall
not be allowed any representation in the Lok Sabha or in
the concerned Legislative Assembly, as the case may be.
3.2.8.4 Such a provision is in vogue in Germany and has
helped in checking the proliferation of political parties.
Article 6(6) of the Federal Electoral Laws says: "In
distributing the seats among the Land lists, only such
parties be taken into consideration as have obtained at
least five per cent of the valid second votes cast in the
electoral area or have won a seat in at least three
constituencies." In other words, a party must poll at least
five per cent of the second votes in the entire country or
must have won at least in three constituency seats on the
basis of the first votes. As a matter of fact, since the
elections for Bundestag in 1957, the qualifying parties
have been (1) the Christian Democratic Union of Germany
(CDU), (2) the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD),
(3) the Christian Social Union (CSU), which put up
candidates in Bavaria only and (4) the Free Democratic
Party (FDP). The Greens were represented in Bundestag for
the first time following the Bundestag election in 1983.
In the first all German general elections in 1990 (after
the reunification of Germany), however, they were able to
win seats in the Bundestag only as members of the list
coalition (Alliance 90/Greens) with the Party Alliance 90
which was successful in the new federal states. This
requirement has thus prevented the proliferation of
political parties, splintering of political parties and has
led to polarisation.
3.2.8.5 Such a provision is a crying necessity in India
today where the process of splintering of parties is
increasing with every general election which is not based
on any ideological differences but lust for power.
Appropriate provision to this effect is being set out in
this Report.
3.2.9 With respect to the objection that in the case of a
list system there is no umbilical cord between voter and
the MP/MLA, this is devoid of any substance. Apart from
the fact that such a mixed system is in vogue in many
countries (e.g. in Germany), the merit of the list system
lies in the fact that for the members chosen under the list
system, the entire territorial unit/ State/ nation is the
constituency. In fact, there have been several instances
where powerful politicians like Prime Ministers and Chief
Ministers have been `nursing' their particular constituency
with the result that the development in that particular
constitutuency is far ahead of the development in the
adjacent and other constituencies in the region or the
State. "Nursing" the constituency does not mean this. It
means attending to, representing and fighting for the
interests of the voters in all fora and not to corrupt them
with the aid of public funds. It is indeed a case of
misuse of authority and of public money. It is not a good
idea that one particular constituency should be rewarded
unduly merely because the Prime Minister or the Chief
Minister happens to contest from that constituency.
3.2.10. The other merit in the list system apart from those
set out in chapter III of Part I is that important leaders
of the political parties can be included in the list put
forward by that political party and those leaders can
devote their energies in campaigning for the party
throughout the State instead of xpending a good amount of
their energies on the particular constituency from which
they are contesting. In fact the list system would provide
an opportunity for inclusion of important leaders with high
character and reputation and technocrats and experts in
finance and economics. The apprehension that the criminal
elements and money bags would be included in such a list is
unfounded inasmuch as no political party would dare include
criminal elements and/or money bags in such a list, since
it would also reflect negatively upon its candidates in the
direct election from the territorial constituencies.
3.2.11. With respect to the objection that Rajya Sabha or
for that matter, Legislative Councils in whichever States
they exist - serve the purpose and satisfy the objective
underlying the list system, it must be stated that the
criticism is not well-founded. Take Rajya Sabha, its
members are elected by the members of the Legislative
Assemblies of various States in the Union (Except twelve
members who are nominated). In other words, those very
MLAs, who are more often than not elected on a minority of
the votes cast in the given State, elect the members of
Rajya Sabha. The members so elected neither represent the
wasted votes (as explained hereinabove) no rectify and
redress the imbalance between the votes received and seats
won by a political party. Rajya Sabha is indeed a
reflection of the composition of State Legislative
Assemblies; it is repetition of the same inequitable FPP
system. None of the distortions, to remove which list
system has been proposed, are answered by the Rajya Sabha
or the Legislative Councils. There is equally no merit in
the objection that the introduction of list system would
give rise to two classes of MPs/MLAs. Such a dual system
is in vogue in several countries and is functioning
satisfactorily.
3.2.11.1. In its Report on "Electoral Reforms", 1974
the Tarkunde Committee (appointed by Shri Jaya Prakash
Narayan on behalf of the citizen for Democracy had also
recommended the adoption of `mixed system' i.e. German
Model of Electoral system.
3.2.12. There remains the question whether the list system
should be limited to 25% or raised to 50% of the existing
strength of Lok Sabha and of each of the State Legislative
Assemblies. We had also debated this aspect while
preparing the working paper but we limited the strength to
be filled on this basis to 25% of the existing strength for
the reason that by adopting the 50% rule, the strength of
Lok Sabha would rise to almost 826. May be that this
number is not excessive considering the population and
territorial extent of this country, but what was
apprehended was that an Assembly of 826 members would be unmanageable. Yet another consideration was that since the
list system is being introduced for the first time on an
experimental basis, we may start with 25% and if it proves
beneficial it can be raised to 50% and if the experience
proves counter-productive, it can be abandoned.
3.2.13. With respect to the suggestion that the list system
should not be confined to the recognised political parties,
it must be said that acceptance of this plea would indeed
lead to proliferation of political parties, which is
admittedly not in the interest of a successnful democracy.
The singular example of Telugu Desam in Adhra Pradesh in
1982-83 cannot be made the basis for adopting a system
which will make the operation of the list system cumbersome
and which may indeed prove counter productive.
3.2.14. There is one more aspect to be considered. Certain
participants in the seminar and certain responses received
by the Law Commission suggest that the concept of
`territorial unit' put forward by the Law Commission in
this context should be given up and the entire country
should be treated as one unit for the purpose of choosing
the members according to list system. The main purpose
behind this suggestion was elimination of small parties and
to prevent the proliferation of political parties, as also
to exclude splinter parties and thereby ensuring that
Parliament functioned properly and the government was
stable - the very same object underlying the requirement of
5% vote. May be that this objective can be achieved by the
provision now being suggested by us that any political
party which receives less than 5% of the total valid votes
cast in the general election to the Lok Sabha or State
Legislative Assembly, as the case may be, shall not be
entitled to any seats in the Lok Sabha/Legislative
Assembly. But, it would be consistent with our other
recommendations and the spirit of this Report if the
concept of territorial units put forward by us earlier in
the working paper is given up. Our objective in doing so
is to drive the smaller parties into pre-election
fronts/coalitions. May be, these smaller parties may
fight, wherever they like, on their own symbol but they
will have to become a part of one or the other pre-election
front which is proposed to be treated as a political party
for the purpose of the Tenth Schedule. In such a coalition/front, there is bound to be
adjustment/appointment of seats and voters will be voting
for the candidate of a constituent party keeping in mind
the constituents of the coalition front.
3.2.15. Conclusions - Accordingly, we have decided to
drop our proposal with respect to territorial units which
means that the entire country will be the unit for purposes
of the list system while reiterating our proposals put
forward in the working paper in this behalf. (The relevant
provisions in the Bill are modified accordingly).
3.2.15.1. Though we are dropping the proposal with
respect to territorial units, we do hereby affirm that the
distribution of seats in Lok Sabha among the States, as set
out in the First Schedule to the Representation of the
People Act, 1950, should be frozen for another 25 years.
For this purpose, it would be necessary to amend the
proviso to clause (3) of article 81 of the Constitution by
substituting the figure "2025" for the figure "2000". [The
reason behind this proposal is the one put forward by Shri
Shivaramakrishnan of Centre for Policy Research, referred
to in para 3.2.5.]
3.2.15.2. Further, another proviso (i.e.second
proviso) may be added after the existing proviso in section
78F as proposed in the Representation of the People Act,
1951 in the following words: "Provided further that the
votes received by a recognised political party which do not
exceed one-sixth of the total number of valid votes polled
in a constituency shall be ignored for the purpose of this
section."
3.2.15.3. A new section, section 65A shall be
inserted in Chapter V of Part V of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 to the following effect:
"65A(1) Any political party, whether recognised or
not, which obtains less than 5% of the total valid
votes cast in the election to the House of the
People shall not be entitled to any seat in the
House of the People.
(2) Any political party, whether recognised or not,
which obtains less than 5% of the total valid votes
cast in the election to the Legislative Assembly of
a State shall not be entitled to any seat in the
Legislative Assembly.
(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2),
the relevant date shall be the date on which the
notification contemplated by section 73 of this Act
is issued.
(4) Any constituency which has elected the
candidate of a political party which is deprived of
a seat in the House of People or in legislative
Assembly on account of the requirement in
sub-section (1) and (2), as the case may be, shall
be represented by the candidate of a political
party which has obtained the next highest votes
provided that his political party obtains 5% of the
total valid votes cast in that election and that he
has not lost the security deposit.
(5) The requirements in sub-sections (1) to (3)
shall not apply in the case of a bye-election.
For more information:
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